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 Abstract—The technique of transforming voices in order to 
hide the real identity of a speaker is called voice disguise, among 
which automatic voice disguise (AVD) by modifying the spectral 
and temporal characteristics of voices with miscellaneous 
algorithms are easily conducted with softwares accessible to the 
public. AVD has posed great threat to both human listening and 
automatic speaker verification (ASV). In this paper, we have 
found that ASV is not only a victim of AVD but could be a tool to 
beat some simple types of AVD. Firstly, three types of AVD, pitch 
scaling, vocal tract length normalization (VTLN) and voice 
conversion (VC), are introduced as representative methods. 
State-of-the-art ASV methods are subsequently utilized to 
objectively evaluate the impact of AVD on ASV by equal error 
rates (EER). Moreover, an approach to restore disguised voice to 
its original version is proposed by minimizing a function of ASV 
scores w.r.t. restoration parameters. Experiments are then 
conducted on disguised voices from Voxceleb, a dataset recorded 
in real-world noisy scenario. The results have shown that, for the 
voice disguise by pitch scaling, the proposed approach obtains an 
EER around 7% comparing to the 30% EER of a recently 
proposed baseline using the ratio of fundamental frequencies. The 
proposed approach generalizes well to restore the disguise with 
nonlinear frequency warping in VTLN by reducing its EER from 
34.3% to 18.5%. However, it is difficult to restore the source 
speakers in VC by our approach, where more complex forms of 
restoration functions or other paralinguistic cues might be 
necessary to restore the nonlinear transform in VC. Finally, 
contrastive visualization on ASV features with and without 
restoration illustrate the role of the proposed approach in an 
intuitive way. 
 
Index Terms—Automatic voice disguise, Pitch scaling, Vocal 
tract length normalization, Voice conversion, Automatic speaker 
verification 
 
I.! INTRODUCTION 
In the era of artificial intelligence and big data, Automatic 
speaker verification (ASV) is an important means to automate 
the surveillance of fraud calls. ASV makes a decision based on 
whether two pieces of voices are from the same person or not, 
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by extracting their features and computing their similarities. 
However, the attackers could hide their real identities by voice 
disguise. Consequently, ASV would fail when making 
decisions with the disguised voices. 
Automatic voice disguise (AVD) aims to automatically 
transform voices by algorithms in order to hide the real identity 
of a speaker, and can be easily conducted with softwares 
accessible to the public and has brought great threat to 
information security. For example, pitch scaling can raise or 
decrease the pitch of a piece of voice by frequency shifting or 
temporal stretching in a linear style [1]. Improving from the 
linear transform to nonlinear ones, Vocal Tract Length 
Normalization (VTLN) warps the frequency axis into different 
directions [2]. Theoretically, any function from [0,! ] to [0,! ] 
can perform as the frequency warping in VTLN, if the warping 
retains the intelligibility of the transformed speech. Voice 
conversion (VC) refers to digital cloning of a person's voice, 
which can be used to modify audio waveform so that it appears 
as if spoken by some specific person (i.e. the target speaker) 
than the original speaker (i.e. the source speaker). Recently, 
voice conversion challenges have been conducted to elaborate 
VC techniques in VCC 2016, 2018 and 2020 [3]. With the 
nonlinear mapping of spectral features in VC, the identity of the 
source speaker could be hidden since the converted voice 
sounds like from the target speaker. In summary, all these AVD 
methods would mislead ASV by modifying the spectral and 
temporal characteristics of voices, as will be quantitatively 
evaluated in Section VI.A. 
With the increasing of crimes conducted by voice disguise, a 
lot of research has explored the impacts of disguised voices on 
ASV. The research in [4]-[6] revealed the vulnerability of 
traditional ASV systems against human disguise of voices. The 
work in [7] reported the Equal Error Rate (EER) on human 
disguised voice was as high as 24.7% by using a recently 
proposed deep neural network method for ASV from [8]. The 
work in [4] revealed that the performance of human disguise 
depended on the disguising skills of the imposter. Therefore, 
non-skilled imposters may tend to use AVD instead, rather than 
human disguise. It is thus important to evaluate the impact of 
AVD on state-of-the-art ASV (e.g. x-vectors [9]). Recently, [10] 
reported the severe deterioration of the performance of 
x-vectors on VC-based speaker anonymization. All these works 
have revealed the vulnerability of ASV on voice disguise.  
The first step to defend against AVD is detecting whether a 
piece of voice is disguised or not [11]. Algorithms by analyzing 
the changing rule of the Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 
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(MFCC) through Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) were 
investigated to identify disguised voices by pitch scaling in [12]. 
MFCCs and their statistical moments were extracted and 
utilized as input features for Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
to classify voices into normal ones or disguised ones by pitch 
scaling [13]-[15]. The experiments showed that the detection 
rate reached over 90% accuracy on their cross-database 
evaluation. A method based on a dense convolutional network 
for detecting disguised voice by pitch scaling from genuine 
voice was presented in [16]. The experimental results showed 
that the average accuracies over intra-database and 
cross-database is 96.45%, superior to the state-of-the-art 
methods. Given the fact that automatically disguised voices 
should be synthesized and replayed to attack ASV systems, the 
detection of speech synthesis and voice conversion (named by 
logical attack, LA), and the detection of recording replay 
(named by physical attack, PA), were proposed and extensively 
studied in ASVspoof 2015, 2017 and 2019 [17]-[19]. The 
proposed anti-spoofing approach had successfully detected 
spoofing voices from speech synthesis, voice conversion, and 
recording replay etc., with high accuracies. These techniques 
usually perform as a prerequisite step to secure ASV systems 
by filtering out spoofing voices, which hence exclude disguised 
ones. Data augmentation was utilized in [10] to link disguised 
voices and their original ones by re-training i-vectors/x-vectors 
in the training and enrollment stages of ASV for each speaker. 
In this paper, the AVD detection and speaker verification will 
be merged, where normal voice will be treated as a special case 
of disguised voice with some special disguising parameters. 
Therefore, the detection of AVD does not have to be a 
standalone task any more, which is an advantage of the 
proposed method in this paper. 
It seems not enough for tracing the criminals conducting 
voice disguise by only classifying a piece of voice is disguised 
or not, but the restoration of the original voice is necessary for 
listening tests as interpretable evidences. In order to improve 
ASV on disguised voices, Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) was 
applied to restore pitch scaling disguised voices by estimating 
the degree of disguise, which improved the performance of 
Vector Quantization (VQ) on speaker recognition [20]. The 
ratio of fundamental frequencies was utilized to estimate the 
degree of pitch-scaling disguise for voice restoration, based on 
which restored MFCCs were extracted as features of a 
GMM-UBM system for ASV in [21]. In their objective 
evaluation, the method yielded an EER around 4% on TIMIT, a 
dataset with clean speech, which significantly reduced the EER 
of 40% without the restoration of disguised voices. The 
methods proposed in [20] and [21] proved the necessity and 
usefulness of the restoration of disguised voices. However, the 
methods were only experimented on clean speech with 
traditional speaker recognition methods for pitch scaling. More 
challenging datasets, more complex disguising methods and 
more advanced speaker recognition models should be 
considered to study the restoration of disguised voices, which is 
one of the motivating aspect for this paper. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to explore the mutual relation of 
ASV and AVD, e.g., why ASV is vulnerable to AVD, if the 
features and metrics involved in ASV reflect some hidden facts 
of the disguised voices, and if there exists a universal method to 
reduce the vulnerability of ASV on AVD. This is the other 
motivating aspect of this paper.  
In this paper, AVD is firstly summarized into a function 
described by disguising parameters in Section II. 
State-of-the-art ASV methods are then introduced to 
quantitively evaluate the impact of AVD in Section III. An 
approach to estimate the restoration function is proposed by 
minimizing a function of ASV scores w.r.t. restoration 
parameters in Section IV. Experimental setups of datasets, 
baselines and the details of model configurations are presented 
in Section V. Results, comparison and discussion are given in 
Section VI. Finally, we conclude that ASV is not only a victim 
of voice disguise but could be a tool to beat AVD with 
relatively simple transformations in Section VII.  
II.! MODELING OF AUTOMATIC VOICE DISGUISE 
AVD is normally realized by modifying the temporal or 
spectral properties of voices, e.g. in a linear style by pitch 
scaling, in a non-linear style by VTLN or by a complex spectral 
mapping function in VC. In this section, we will briefly 
introduce these three types of disguise and analyze their pros 
and cons.  
A.! Pitch scaling by frequency shifting or temporal stretching 
Pitch scaling aims to modify the voice pitch of a speaker to 
hide his/her identity. In essence, it can be achieved by 
stretching the spectrum in frequency-domain or voice 
resampling in time-domain. 
 
1)! Frequency-domain disguise 
Frequency-domain disguise is usually operated by 
expanding or compressing the spectrum while keeping the 
content of the voice unchanged. Mathematically, the 
instantaneous frequency ! is modified to !! by introducing a 
scaling factor s, as defined in (1),  
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Correspondingly, the disguised spectrum is, 
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It can be seen from the analysis above that the scaling factor s 
plays a deterministic role in the frequency-domain disguise by 
stretching the spectrum.  
 
2)! Time-domain disguise 
Time-domain disguise can be realized by adjusting the 
sampling rate, which changes the fundamental frequency of 
speech signal and hence the pitch [22]. However, the disguised 
voice generated in this way often sounds unnatural. A 
technique from speech synthesis, Pitch-Synchronous Overlap 
and Add method (PSOLA) is deployed to improve the 
naturalness the disguised voices [23]. Unvoiced speech is 
non-periodic and is quite close to white noise, which has little 
information on speaker identity and does not need to be 
transformed for voice disguising purpose. Assuming x(t) is 
voiced speech, PSOLA first detects the position and contour of 
the formants of the signal by extracting the pitch-period parts. 
The time indices of a pitch-period are then modified by, 
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where s is a scaling factor, P!(t) is the modified pitch period P(t) 
/ s. Therefore, the disguised waveform is obtained by, 
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As same as in frequency-domain disguise, it can be seen from 
the analysis above that the scaling factor s also plays a 
deterministic role in the time-domain disguise by stretching 
pitch-periods. PSOLA only modifies the prosodic features of 
fundamental frequency, duration, and short-term energy of 
speech, so that the disguised voice has a similar envelope as the 
original one. 
 
3)! Unified representation for the disguise with pitch scaling 
In the technique of audio processing, pitch can be increased 
or decreased by up to 12 semitones [14]. Given this rule, the 
pitch of the original voice, p0, and the pitch of the disguised 
voice, p1, can be expressed by, 
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where " is the semitone factor which is also called disguising 
parameter in this paper. It is straightforward to see that a 
positive/negative " turns up/down the pitch by " semitones, 
while "=0 means no change on the voice. 
    By considering pitch as a special value of ! in (1), it is easy 
to find that, 
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which bridges the scaling factor s and the pitch values of the 
original and disguised voices. The disguising parameter " and 
the scaling factor s have thus the following relationship,  
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As explained above, AVD based on both frequency-domain 
disguise and time-domain disguise boils down to the 
proportional modification of frequency indices and 
pitch-periods, where scaling factor s is introduced to quantize 
the transform. With the transform from s to " in (7), the 
disguised voice y is hereby represented in a unified form, 
         ( ; ),y f x !=                          (8) 
where " quantifies the frequency warping in (1) or the 
pitch-period stretching in (3) measured by semitones. 
B.! Frequency warping by nonlinear functions in VTLN 
It is believed that the difference of the speaker's vocal tract 
length leads to the variability of the speech waveform of the 
same language content [2]. The original purpose of VTLN is to 
normalize the speaker's voice in order to remove individual 
speaker characteristics and improve the accuracy of speech 
recognition. VTLN can also be used for voice disguise by 
adjusting the frequency axis of the spectrogram through the 
warping function to hide the individual characteristics of the 
vocal tract length. 
In this paper, AVD by VTLN has six steps: pitch marking, 
frame segmentation, fast Fourier transform (FFT), VTLN, 
inverse FFT and PSOLA [24]. The purpose of pitch marking 
and frame segmentation is to cut speech signals into frames that 
match the pseudo-periodic of a voiced sound, so that the output 
speech would have the best sound quality. In AVD by VTLN, 
the choice of frequency warping function plays an important 
role, where the commonly used functions have the following 
ones, see mathematical formulas in [2] and codes in [25].  
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4)! Piecewise linear function  
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where ! is the original instantaneous frequency, '!  is the 
warped one, " is the disguising parameter to reflect the 
nonlinearity of the warping, and i is the imaginary unit in (9). 
For simplicity, the disguised voice y by using the four 
warping functions of VTLN can also be summarized by (8) 
where different warping functions result in different f ’s in (8) 
and " controls the disguising strength. 
C.! Voice conversion by spectral mapping 
VC modifies a person’s voice to imitate some target person 
while keeping the linguistic information unchanged. It is worth 
noting that voice conversion is different from voice 
transformation (e.g. pitch scaling in Section II.A and VTLN in 
Section II.B) where the former one has a specific target speaker 
while the latter one does not.  
In this paper, the competitive baseline provided in VCC2018 
is adopted and introduced here. A vocoder, e.g. STRAIGHT 
[26] or WORLD [27], is conventionally first utilized to 
decompose speech into F0 contour, spectral features, and 
aperiodic residuals, where the F0 contour and spectral features 
are converted to those of the target speakers while the aperiodic 
residuals does not have to be converted. The F0 contour is 
converted in its log linear format to match the statistics of the 
target speaker [3]. In the training stage, VC learns a mapping of 
spectral features between the source speaker and the target 
speaker. With the learned mappings, any voice from the source 
speaker can be converted to that sounds like from the target 

j (1"j"C) with disguising parameter " (for pitch scaling and 
VTLN, " is sampled from an interval -R"""R; while for VC, " 
is a pre-trained GMM or DNN model for a target speaker), and 
C is the total number of speakers for testing. The information 
on i, j and " is only used for making testing datasets, on which 
the ASV algorithms are completely blind.  
The values of i and j are both random samples to make a 
representative list of trials. Speaker i can be either the same as 
speaker j or not.  A decision on if xi and yj," are from the same 
speaker is made by introducing a threshold #,  
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By choosing a specific value of the threshold #, EER is 
computed by equaling the false rejection rate (FRR) and the 
false acceptance rate (FAR). It is straightforward to see that the 
cases of pitch scaling and VTLN with " = 0 degrade to the 
conventional ASV task without voice disguise.  
In order to identify the speaker in disguised voices, a 
pre-requested step might be to check if the voice is disguised or 
not. However, in the evaluation recipe presented above, speaker 
verification is conducted directly without considering if a piece 
of voice is disguised or not, which is a more difficult task than 
that only identifying the existence of disguising which is 
actually a sub-task to check if " is zero. As will be seen later in 
Section IV, the value of " will be estimated in an automatic way. 
However, incorporating the proposed method would inevitably 
result in higher false alarm rates for the underlying ASV system. 
Therefore, the performance drop of the system will be 
evaluated and discussed on the data without AVD in Section 
VI.C. Please refer to the cases with " =0 on Fig. 4. 
IV.! RESTORATION OF AUTOMATICALLY DISGUISED VOICES 
In order to alleviate the negative impact of voice disguise on 
ASV, a critical step would be to restore the disguised voice to 
its original version on which speaker verification is 
subsequently performed and listening test can also be 
conducted to give interpretable evidences. As summarized in 
Section II, AVD by pitch scaling and VTLN have both been 
summarized by a disguising parameter " in (8). Once an 
estimation of the disguising parameter is given, say !ˆ , the 
restored voice is obtained by, 
1 ˆˆ ( ; ),x f y !"=                               (14) 
where 
1( )f ! " is the inverse transform of (3) and (7) for pitch 
scaling or (9) - (12) for VTLN and xˆ  is the restored voice. For 
the case with i=j, a relatively low distance is expected for some 
"; while for the case with i#j, relatively high distances are 
expected for all "’s.  
However, for VC, it is difficult to model the disguise by one 
parameter, therefore its restoration is approximated by taking 
1( )f ! "  in forms of pitch scaling or VTLN instead. This is an 
ad hoc solution to make the restoration of VC disguised voices 
feasible. 
Therefore, the restoration boils down to estimating the 
parameter ". In this section, for pitch scaling, two methods are 
presented. The first one is the estimation of disguising 
parameters by using the ratio of fundamental frequencies from 
[21], which is taken as the baseline in this paper. The other is to 
use ASV as a tool to estimate the disguising parameters by 
minimizing a function of ASV scores w.r.t. disguising 
parameters. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing 
solution for the restoration of VTLN, so only our proposed 
approach is evaluated. 
 
A.! Estimating the disguising parameter by the ratio of 
fundamental frequencies [21] 
In phonetics, pitch is usually used to describe the human's 
perception of the frequency of sound. AVD conducted by pitch 
scaling scales the frequency components according to different 
disguising parameters, thereby also changes the pitch of the 
voice. The fundamental frequency reflects the important 
characteristics of the excitation source of speech and is a 
relatively stable frequency component in the speech signal.  
The ratio between the pitch of the original voice, p0, and the 
pitch of the disguise voice, p1, can be utilized to estimate the 
disguising parameter as presented in (6) and (7). The method is 
called F0-ratio in short in this paper. The estimated disguising 
parameter is subsequently applied to restore the MFCC features 
which are the inputs of ASV to identify the disguised speaker.  
For each pair of evaluation, {x,y}, the following steps are 
used to make an estimate. 
1) A sequence of fundamental frequencies are extracted 
from the frames of x, and their average value fx is calculated.  
2) A sequence of fundamental frequencies are extracted 
from the frames of y and their average value fy is calculated. 
The disguising parameter " is calculated by (15), 
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In steps 1) and 2), Simplified Inverse Filter Tracking (SITF) is 
used to extract the fundamental frequency.  
3) With the restored spectrum, if necessary, Griffin-Lim 
algorithm is applied to recover the restored speech [37].  
4) Restored voices are then utilized to compute the distance 
for the trial {x,y}, 
 
1 ˆ( ( ), ( ( ; ))).d g x g f y !"                      (16) 
It is worth noting that one does not have to obtain the 
waveform to compute the distance, but the restored MFCCs 
should be enough for computing (16). 
B.! ASV as a tool to estimate disguising parameters 
For each pair of evaluation, {x,y}, the following steps are 
used to make a decision, as is shown in Fig. 3. 
 

tempo has little impact on speaker verification, this paper only 
considers changing pitch in frequency-domain disguise and 
changing rate in time-domain disguise. The disguising 
parameter " of pitch scaling is ranged from -11 to 11, where 
only integers are considered. Therefore, the original 678 
testing utterances yield 678$23 combinations in total, among 
which 10k trials are randomly taken for the disguising by pitch 
scaling. 
Per the disguising with VTLN, the open source toolbox in 
[25] is utilized, again for the reproducibility of our results. The 
toolbox has four choices of nonlinear warping functions, 
bilinear, quadratic, power and piecewise-linear, to conduct the 
nonlinear mapping of frequency axes from the original voices 
to the disguised voices according to different disguising 
parameters. The range is set as large as possible until the 
disguised voice is unintelligible, while the step is taken as 
small as possible unless the disguised voices with neighboring 
parameters are distinguishable. The values are listed in Table 
II.  
 
TABLE II 
THE RANGE OF THE DISGUISING PARAMETERS FOR VTLN WARPING 
FUNCTIONS 
Warping function Range Step 
Bilinear [-0.3, 0.3] 0.02 
Quadratic [-2, 2] 0.2 
Power [-0.5, 0.5] 0.05 
Piecewise-linear [0.5, 1.5] 0.05 
 
For each trial {x,y} to evaluate the disguise conducted by 
VTLN, x is randomly chosen from the original 678 utterances, 
while y is randomly chosen from the disguised ones by 
appointing one of the four warping functions and choosing ! 
randomly in Table II. In this paper, 10k trials are randomly 
taken for the disguising using VTLN where x and y share the 
same utterance ID with those in pitch scaling for comparison 
purpose. 
A competitive baseline provided by VCC 2018, sprocket, is 
taken as the tool for VC disguise [28]. Sprocket is open source, 
has well-established routines and has generated ready-for-use 
samples available online. In this paper, the samples from the 
target speakers are unused since it is only concerned to 
recover the identity of the source speaker given his/her 
converted samples. 
There are 280 samples from eight source speakers and 
11200 samples converted from the eight speakers, which are 
treated as original and disguised voices, respectively. For each 
trial {x,y}, x and y are randomly chosen from the original and 
disguised voices, respectively. In this paper, 1.6k trials are 
randomly taken for evaluation.  
C.! Restoration and evaluation setup 
As presented in Section IV.C, both pitch scaling and VLTN 
power are utilized to restore the disguised voices generated in 
Section V.B. For the restoration by pitch scaling, each 
disguised voice y is pre-restored into 23 versions by 
enumerating ! from -11 to 11. While for the restoration by the 
power function of VTLN in (11), each disguised voice y is 
restored into 21 versions by enumerating ! from -0.5 to 0.5 
with step 0.05. 
EERs computed on disguised voices without any restoration 
are also given to illustrate the threat of AVD on ASV. For the 
ASV baseline without disguise, the standard list of trials given 
in Voxceleb1 is used, which has 37,720 trials in total [38]. 
D.! Time-Frequency features utilized in ASV 
After removing the silent parts of an utterance by voice 
activity detection, a window with 25ms frame-length and 
15ms frame-shift is applied to extract acoustic features. Each 
frame is represented by its MFCC, a 24-dimensional vector 
with its 1st and 2nd order differences across time, i.e. 
72-dimension in total. 
E.! i-vector for ASV 
The GMM-UBM i-vector model used in this paper is 
trained on the Training part of Table I. The number of 
Gaussian components is 2048. Maximum a posteriori (MAP) 
is used to adjust the MFCC features of each enrollment/testing 
utterance to obtain a 400-dimensional vector. Then LDA is 
utilized to reduce the dimension of the vector from 400 to 200. 
The 200-dim vector is called i-vector. A PLDA is learned as 
the backend classifier to compute the distance of the two 
i-vectors extracted for each trial {x,y}. 
F.! x-vector for ASV 
The training data is again the Training part of Table I. The 
architecture of TDNN is shown in Table III where T is the 
number of frames of an utterance. The margin in AMSoftmax 
loss is 0.20. The model is trained from scratch. The batch size is 
64 and the learning rate starts with 0.01 and is divided by 10 
after 12k iterations without performance promotion. The 
weight decay parameter is 1.0e-3. The training has finished at 
around 40k iterations. No data augmentation is applied during 
training. 
Like in the extraction of i-vector, LDA is also applied to 
reduce the dimension of the output of Segment-Layer 6 in 
Table III (i.e. l6 in Fig.2), from a 512-dim vector to a 200-dim 
one which is called x-vector. A PLDA is again learned as the 
backend classifier to output the distance of the two x-vectors 
extracted for each trial {x,y}. 
 
TABLE III
THE ARCHITECTURE OF TDNN 
Layer Layer Context Structure 
Frame-Layer 1 [ 2, 2]t t! +  216 512!  
Frame-Layer 2 { 2, , 2}t t t! +  1536 512!  
Frame-Layer 3 { 3, , 3}t t t! +  1536 512!  
Frame-Layer 4 { }t  512 512!  
Frame-Layer 5 { }t  512 1500!  
Statistic Pooling [0, )T  1500 3000T !  
Segment-Layer 6 {0}  3000 512!  
Segment-Layer 7 {0}  512 512!  
 
VI.! RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, we first report the results of the impact of 
AVD (i.e. pitch scaling, VTLN and VC) on ASV and the 
performance of its restoration by ASV. Extensive comparison 
with an existing solution using F0-ratio is subsequently 
presented to evaluate the usefulness of the proposed approach. 
Intuitive illustration of the role of the method on pitch scaling is 
also given by visualizing the distribution of ASV features. 
Results on match and mismatch conditions between disguising 
and restoration are discussed to explore possible improvements 
on difficult cases e.g. VTLN and VC. 
 
A.! Impact of AVD on ASV and its restoration by ASV 
The EERs of the disguise-restoration pairs are given in Table 
IV for i-vector and in Table V for x-vector.  Some interesting 
conclusions are drawn from the tables. 
 
TABLE IV 
EERS (%) OF ASV ON VOXCELEB1-TEST (I-VECTOR) 
Disguise 
Restoration 
Pitch scaling VTLN (all) Voice conversion 
None 44.14 39.86 46.80 
Pitch scaling 13.58 28.92 42.66 
VTLN (power) 39.12 24.98 43.54 
 
TABLE V 
EERS (%) OF ASV ON VOXCELEB1-TEST (X-VECTOR) 
Disguise 
Restoration 
Pitch scaling VTLN (all) Voice conversion 
None 38.84 34.40 43.91 
Pitch scaling 7.10 21.54 43.54 
VTLN (power) 33.40 18.54 43.66 
 
1)! Higher nonlinearity in disguise, greater threat to ASV  
By comparing the columns in both Table IV and V, 
increasing trends of EERs are observed with the increasing of 
nonlinearity in disguising, i.e. from pitch scaling to VC. Even 
with voice restoration, disguising methods with higher 
nonlinearity still yield higher EERs, which indicat greater 
threat to ASV systems. 
 
2)! More advanced ASV, fewer chances deceived by AVD  
By comparing the values of the corresponding entries of 
Table IV and V, x-vector generally yields lower EERs than 
i-vector, except the slight fluctuations on VC. This indicates 
that more advanced ASV approaches, fewer chances deceived 
by AVD. 
 
3)! Matched disguise-restoration performed good  
It is not strange that best results are always obtained when 
the disguise method matched the restoration one, as notified by 
the bold texts in Table IV and V. However, it is worth noting 
that even in the matched case the disguising parameter is not 
known, which is slightly different from the white-box case 
commonly used in analyzing the vulnerability of artificial 
intelligent systems, where white-box means both model and 
parameters are known [41].  
 
4)! Linear, quadratic and beyond 
Pitch scaling seems a better way than VTLN (power) for 
completely blind restoration, by comparing the EERs of pitch 
scaling restoration (i.e. the second rows of Table IV and V) and 
the EERs of VTLN (power) restoration (i.e. the second rows of 
Table IV and V).  
The combination of the first order pitch scaling and the 
second order power would further reduce EERs presented in 
Table IV and V. More sophisticated polynomial functions with 
higher orders would also work, which is worth exploring as the 
future work.  
 
B.! Subjective evaluation of AVD and its restoration by ASV 
In this section, subjective evaluation of AVD and its 
restoration by ASV is conducted, where only 30 trials are 
randomly chosen from the total 10k trials presented in Section 
V.B to make it a feasible job for human listening. For each of 
the nine combinations in Table V, a half of trials are from the 
same speaker while the reaming ones are from different 
speakers, in order to generate a balanced testing set. Listeners 
are asked to decide if the two utterances of each trial are from 
the same speaker or not 
1
. Error rates are then calculated and 
presented in Table VI. 
  
TABLE VI 
ERROR RATES (%) OF HUMAN SPEAKER VERIFICATION ON VOXCELEB1-TEST 
(RESTORATION BY X-VECTOR) 
Disguise 
Restoration 
Pitch scaling VTLN (all) Voice conversion 
None 50.00 46.67 46.67 
Pitch scaling 13.33 40.00 50.00 
VTLN (power) 36.67 23.33 43.33 
 
It can be seen from the first row of Table VI that AVD 
seriously confuses human speaker verification (HSV) where 
random guess is observed. With the restoration of disguised 
voices by ASV using x-vector, the accuracy of HSV is 
improved to a certain amount. The relative improvements of 
restoration on disguise are consistent w.r.t. those in Table V. 
However, even with restoration, HSV generally performs 
worse than ASV, which indicates that the necessity of 
implementing ASV to assist human’s decision. 
 
C.! Comparison with the F0-ratio baseline on pitch scaling 
The average results of EERs through 23 disguising 
parameters of pitch scaling are summarized in Table VII The 
EER of ASV increases from 2.057% to 38.84%/38.68% with 
disguised voices generated by frequency-domain/time-domain 
transform. All restoration methods have reduced the EERs. 
Compared to its performance on TIMIT reported in [21], 
F0-ratio does not perform very well on the noisy dataset 
Voxceleb1, where only 8% EER reduction is observed by 
yielding an EER around 30%. 
Restoration by both i-vector and x-vector improves the 
performance of ASV significantly on disguised voices where 
 
1
 Audio samples: https://github.com/jiakangli93/disguise-reverse 




firstly presented and analyzed. State-of-the-art ASV was then 
introduced to evaluate the impact of AVD on ASV, where 
significant performance drop was seen for ASV on disguised 
voices with all the three disguising types. A method for 
restoring disguised voice to its original version was 
subsequently proposed by optimizing ASV scores w.r.t. the 
parameters of restoration functions, which significantly 
outperformed related baselines on the disguising with pitch 
scaling. The proposed approach generalized well on some 
mismatched conditions, e.g. restoring the pitch scaling AVD by 
VTLN (power), and vice versa. Visualization of ASV features 
found that the proposed approach actually pulled the disguised 
ASV features from the same speaker closer while pushed the 
features from different speakers further.  
However, the current approach failed to cope with complex 
mapping functions in VC. In future, we would like to explore 
high order restoration functions to improve the proposed 
approach's performance on AVD with more sophisticated 
transforms. Analysis techniques from forensic speaker 
recognition should also be useful to improve the defense 
against the AVD conducted by VC. 
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